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Time-sensitivity in Science 
 
Abstract 
I examine the role of time-sensitivity in science by drawing on a discussion between Kevin 
Elliott and Daniel McKaughan (2014) and Daniel Steel (2016), on the role of non-
epistemic values in theory assessment and the epistemic status of speed of inference. I 
argue that: 1) speed supervenes on ease of use in the cases they discuss, 2) speed is an 
epistemic value, and 3) Steel’s account of values (2010) doesn’t successfully distinguish 
extrinsically epistemic from non-epistemic values. Finally, I propose an account of time-
sensitivity.  
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1. Introduction 
Kevin Elliott and Daniel McKaughan (2014) argue that non-epistemic values sometimes 
legitimately take priority over epistemic ones in assessing scientific theories, models, and 
hypotheses because scientific representations are not only evaluated based on their fit with 
the world, but also based on the fit with the needs of their users. Their argument draws on 
accounts of scientific representation by Ronald Giere and Bas van Fraassen, and two 
examples: expedited risk assessments of the toxicity of substances (Cranor 1993, 1995) 
and rapid assessment methods for wetland banking (Robertson 2004, 2006). The examples 
attempt to show that non-epistemic values such as speed in the toxicity case and ease of 
use in the wetland banking case can have a more decisive role than that of being secondary 
considerations when epistemic values alone don’t suffice to decide which representation to 
choose.  
In a comment on their paper, Daniel Steel (2016) argues that both examples fail to show 
that epistemic values have been overridden by non-epistemic ones, but are rather cases in 
which non-epistemic values serve as secondary considerations for resolving epistemic 
uncertainty. According to Steel, the cases in question are not examples of accepting an 
epistemically inferior option because the argument rests on two problematic implicit 
premises: that it is epistemically better to wait for results generated by a more reliable 
method if one exists (E1), and that it is bad from an epistemic perspective to select a 
simpler, less detailed model over one that is more complex and more detailed (E2). In fact, 
in his (2010) article Steel uses Cranor’s analysis to argue that non-epistemic values can 
influence scientific inferences without compromising epistemic ends. The problem he 
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identifies with Elliott’s and McKaughan’s account is that E1 overlooks the epistemic costs 
of extended suspension of judgment and therefore “threatens to entail the absurd result that 
scientists should never accept any claim” (Steel 2016, 610) while E2 violates the principle 
of Ockham’s razor. Since there are many epistemic purposes to which hypotheses can be 
put, some of which can favor simplicity, there is nothing epistemically wrong with 
choosing a simpler option. Moreover, Steel characterizes both cases as illustrative of time-
sensitivity: 
“Both illustrate what I will call time-sensitivity, wherein it may be better for practical or 
social reasons to accept the results of a quicker-but-less-reliable method rather than wait 
for a slower-but-more-reliable-one. In both instances, there is a pressing interest to draw 
inferences in a timely manner: the protection of public health in the first and the economic 
interest of not unduly delaying construction projects in the second.” (Steel 2016, 609) 
My aim in this paper is to examine the role of time-sensitivity is science. I start by arguing 
against Elliott’s and McKaughan’s view that the two tokens, speed and ease of use, 
independently of one another represent the same type, namely a non-epistemic value that 
sometimes takes priority over epistemic ones in assessing scientific representations. 
Besides the problem of labeling speed and ease of use as non-epistemic, I claim that in 
both cases speed supervenes on simplicity and ease of use, i.e. the methods are simple and 
easy to use in order to be fast and enable fast (soon and many) applications. Both case 
studies are in fact primarily about speed, as already the titles of Elliott’s and McKaughan’s 
chapters reveal: Expedited Risk Assessments and Rapid Assessment Methods.  
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In the third chapter I argue that speed is an epistemic value, contrary to Elliott and 
McKaughan and closer to Steel, but I part from the latter in that I don’t think that the 
epistemic/non-epistemic distinction suffices for explaining decision making in science.   
I proceed by examining a way to account for time-sensitivity with the help of Steel’s 
conceptual framework.  He offers a version of epistemic values which purports to argue in 
favor of maintaining the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction, as well as to be useful for 
delineating legitimate from illegitimate influence of non-epistemic values in research, 
namely by distinguishing between extrinsically and intrinsically epistemic values. (Steel 
2010) It seems to be consistent with Steel’s account to consider time-sensitivity an 
extrinsic epistemic value, since he argues for a broad understanding of epistemic values: 
“Epistemic values can be manifested by things other than theories and hypotheses, such as 
methods, social practices, and community structures.” (2010, 19) In this case, time-
sensitivity might be a value manifested by social practices. However, I show that Steel’s 
account of values doesn’t prove to be helpful for handling the epistemic/non-epistemic 
controversy because it fails to distinguish between extrinsic epistemic values and non-
epistemic values, especially when their influence on scientific research is legitimate, i.e. 
when they don’t obstruct the attainment of truth.  
In the fourth chapter, I claim that time-sensitivity isn’t captured well in either of the 
contrasting notions of value distinctions. I argue that time-sensitivity is not a value of 
methods, but of problems to be solved in their particular contexts. We implicitly or 
explicitly assign a degree of time-sensitivity to problems in their specific contexts, a value 
judgment about when we want or expect to have results from a particular instance of 
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research, but it is neither a value exclusively external nor internal to science, but a 
requirement of efficiency which is both truth seeking and temporally constrained.  
 
2. Speed Supervenes on Ease of Use and Simplicity  
The first example presented in Elliott’s and McKaughan’s paper is based on Carl Cranor’s 
analysis (1993, 1995) of different modelling approaches for assessing risks posed by toxic 
substances that are not pesticides or pharmaceuticals. In the United States the burden of 
proof is on the government to show that these products should be restricted or removed 
from the market and not on the manufacturers that produce them. Cranor analyzes trade-
offs between different modelling approaches for assessing risks and concludes that social 
costs of relying on risk-assessment procedures which are rather accurate but slow are 
greater than of less accurate but quicker methodologies. This conclusion is based on the 
case of California Environmental Protection Agency (CEPA) which used an expedited risk 
assessment methodology in the early 1990s and was able to estimate carcinogenic potency 
of 200 chemicals in an 8 month period, while the traditional methodology was able to 
assess only 70 chemicals in 5 years, though with greater accuracy. The expedited 
procedure is called the linearized multistage default method (LMS) – it uses a carcinogenic 
potency data base, State of California data selection procedures and state-mandated default 
assumptions to facilitate otherwise time-consuming and science-intensive tasks in 
estimating dose-response relationships. Cranor calculates the difference between false 
positives and false negatives using different estimates, some more and some less favorable 
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to the expedited approach. It turns out to be a better approach in every case, in terms of 
minimizing social costs connected to under-regulation of likely carcinogens. Elliott’s and 
McKaughan’s conclusion is that speed is in this case prioritized over accuracy.  
The second case deals with Rapid Assessment Methods (RAMs) for assessing similarity 
between different wetlands as part of mitigation measures when damaging or drying 
wetland areas. A destroyed wetland has to be compensated by preserving or restoring 
another wetland area, and regulatory agencies have to decide whether the destroyed and 
preserved wetlands are sufficiently similar so that the two could be traded. In recent years a 
mitigation “banking” system is developed by regulatory agencies, developers and 
entrepreneurs to handle mitigation. Geographer Morgan Robertson (2004, 2006) analyzes 
different methods to show how the banking method differs from the methods one would 
use if the goal was a detailed ecological characterization. Developers purchase mitigation 
“credits” from specialists who create “banks” of preserved or restored wetlands, in which 
they focus on specific features that are considered relevant for establishing the 
classification of ‘equivalence’ between wetlands. RAMs consist of algorithms that convert 
data about a wetland into a numerical score that estimates a wetland’s functional value and 
is typically represented by one main score rather than a variety of different scores “in order 
to keep the process simple.” (Elliott and McKaughan 2014, 13) This case is supposed to be 
illustrative of ease of use as a value that is here taking priority over predictive accuracy. 
Their overall conclusion is that non-epistemic values sometimes take priority over the 
epistemic ones.  
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Against this, I argue that in these two cases, we are misled to judge speed and ease of use 
on a par with each other, as two tokens of the same type (a non-epistemic value that 
trumped predictive accuracy in assessing scientific representations), when in fact we have 
two cases of favoring an expedited outcome, which supervenes on ease of use.1 Speed of 
inference is a value that has a decisive role of taking priority over predictive accuracy, if 
one wants to agree that this is what happens here, while ease of use and simplicity have 
only a transitive role as a means to achieve faster outcomes and applications. I don’t imply 
that speed is always dependent on ease of use or that the benefits of ease of use and 
simplicity reduce to speed, but I claim that this is what is going on in the two examples. 
For example, a theory can be simple and easy to use, but it can hardly be fast. It would be 
strange to claim that Euclidean geometry is faster than non-Euclidean geometry, or that 
Newtonian mechanics is faster than quantum mechanics. However, here we are not dealing 
with theories, but rather with methods and scientific practices that use simplifications, 
defaults, and idealizations, designed to be applied to problems in particular contexts, and 
these methods and practices will most likely have simplicity and ease of use contributing to 
speed. 
Elliott and McKaughan explicitly set out to show how non-epistemic values sometimes 
trump the epistemic ones such as predictive accuracy, and values that have supposedly 
done so are speed and ease of use. Although the second example is about making wetland 
                                                          
1 To some extent, ease of use of the method supervenes on its simplicity, but this relation is 
not of our interest at the moment.  
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models easy to use, rather than being highly accurate, the reason for doing this is to make 
them readily available and thus – faster to use. RAMs or ‘rapid assessment methods’ are 
indeed called precisely like that, but still the argument put forward is that ease of use is the 
value that took priority over accuracy in this case. It is certainly a feature of the method in 
comparison to more sophisticated ones, but Elliott and McKaughan decided to talk about 
non-epistemic values in general based on the sample of two values which on the closer 
look turn out to be cases in which one value supervenes on the other, and that is speed 
supervening on ease of use, and transitively also on simplicity.  
We can see the connection between simplicity, ease of use, and speed in both cases. 
Expedited risk assessment methodology is less science- and time-intensive, RAMs are easy 
to use because they are simple, and therefore the results are generated faster than it would 
be with methods more detailed, complex, or difficult to handle. Methods do not generate 
results faster in order to be easy to use but are rather easy to use in order to generate results 
faster. It is clear that being easy to use and being fast doesn’t mean the same, but easy is 
here rather to be fast, than the other way around.  
 
3. Speed as an Epistemic Value 
The status of speed of inference is disputed in the discussion. Elliott and McKaughan claim 
that speed is a non-epistemic value: “The cases discussed in the following sections focus 
on conflicts between the epistemic value of accurate prediction versus non-epistemic 
values such as ease of use or speed of generating results.” (2014, 7) In his comment, but 
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also in an earlier article, Steel argues that speed is an epistemic value: “The trade-off 
between the speed and reliability of scientific methods, therefore, is a trade-off between 
two epistemic values.” (2010, 27)  
First of all, not everything in science that we usually attribute values to can have the value 
of speed. Theories and hypothesis can’t be fast, but methods, applications, and more 
broadly, practices, can. Methods, together with theories, models, hypothesis 
(representations) constitute practices in science, and practices can trade off speed and 
accuracy depending on their applications to problems in certain contexts. Speed, together 
with ease of use, is therefore a feature of methods and broader, a feature of practices as 
applied to problems in contexts. Problems, unsurprisingly, need to be solved, so the 
efficiency of methods and practices becomes important and has a bearing on the balance 
between values internal to the scientific practice that addresses them. Steel’s distinction 
between epistemic “building blocks” and epistemic “endpoints” is useful here. Basic 
science is a building block for future research so it has a slower and more cautious 
approach when it comes to balancing reliability and speed of inference, because an error in 
that context is more likely to have damaging effects by leading to more errors. In contrast, 
scientific results that “are used primarily for some practical purpose, such as setting 
allowable exposure levels to toxic chemicals or predicting climate trends (…) are more like 
scientific endpoints than building blocks for future knowledge” (Steel 2010, 27).  
Speed of inference is an internal value of scientific research – there is always a certain 
speed at which methods and practices operate. We might be tempted to call it non-
epistemic because motivations to prioritize speed often come from outside of science and 
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can operate on expense of accuracy. But when speed is understood as speed of getting at 
true, or approximately true results, then it has a clearly epistemic role because it moves us 
temporally closer to truth, i.e. it enables us to get in the possession of knowledge earlier 
and therefore advances our epistemic status. (See Steel 2016, 610) The non-epistemic part 
is still confined to different social and pragmatic reasons such as protection of health or 
economic benefits that instrumentalize speed for their reasons on expense of accuracy. 
However, speed is often a means to promote those without epistemic costs, as Steel argues. 
When it does so, the influence of those non-epistemic reasons is legitimate, when, in 
contrast, speed promotes them without appropriate consideration of accuracy, its 
prioritization, together with their influence, is illegitimate.  
The source of influence is still social, pragmatic, non-epistemic, and speed itself, as a 
feature of a method or a practice, belongs to the internal part of science all along the way 
and has to be traded off against other epistemic values in any case. If non-epistemic 
reasons push the research in a direction that moves it away from the truth, they can distort 
the balance between different values, for example illegitimately prioritize speed of getting 
at any results over accuracy, but it can also happen that their influence on the trade-off is 
harmless or even beneficial, as I will explain later. Social reasons are the non-epistemic 
part here, not the speed that they instrumentalize.  
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4. Extrinsically Epistemic Equals Non-epistemic-but-legitimately-influencing 
Steel’s notion of epistemic values (2010) defines epistemic in terms of either intrinsically 
or extrinsically promoting the attainment of truth. Moreover, it allows that epistemic values 
are manifested by methods, social practices, and community structures. A value that Steel 
analyses at length as an example of an extrinsic epistemic value is simplicity.  
Simplicity is an extrinsic epistemic value for it can be truth-promoting, but only in 
combination with some other intrinsic epistemic value like accuracy, at least a sufficient 
degree of it. Extrinsically epistemic status saves its epistemic role without commitments to 
generality, because circumstances matter. In contrast, empirical accuracy is an intrinsic 
epistemic value, and also a robust one, “in the sense of being epistemic in almost any 
setting”, while most other epistemic values Steel calls contextual because “their capacity to 
promote the attainment of truth depends on occurring within a specific set of 
circumstances” (2010, 20).2 Similar to simplicity, Steel would be consistent to argue that 
speed is a contextual and extrinsic epistemic value because it can promote the attainment 
of truth, but that depends on the appropriate degree of accuracy involved. In both cases 
discussed earlier it is precisely such a value, for it has an epistemic role granted by an 
accompanying degree of accuracy. This role consists in avoiding the cost of suspended 
judgment, which is avoiding a situation that does not bring us closer to truth.  
                                                          
2 Note that his use of “contextual” is not the same as Longino’s in her distinction between 
constitutive and contextual values (Longino 1990).  
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Steel’s account of epistemic is not contrasted with evaluative, social, historical, contingent, 
or contextual in Longino’s sense (2010, 23), so it allows a broader scope of factors to count 
as extrinsically epistemic values, such as fundability or diversity of viewpoints, as long as 
they play a role in attaining the truth. This is why I contend that time-sensitivity might be 
considered as one of Steel’s extrinsically epistemic values. In the two cases from the 
beginning in which time-sensitivity was introduced, it was motivated by non-epistemic 
considerations, but since it didn’t compromise epistemic norms, even more, it promoted 
speed and therefore served an epistemic purpose of moving us temporally closer to truth, it 
was certainly acting extrinsically epistemic by promoting the attainment of truth in the 
given circumstances.  
The problem with Steel’s account is that it fails to discern between extrinsically epistemic 
values and non-epistemic values, especially when their influence is legitimate. The central 
aim of his account is to save the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction because of its 
usefulness in the argument from inductive risk. In order to do that, he develops “a 
principled basis for separating legitimate from illegitimate influences of non-epistemic 
values in scientific inference”, (2010, 14) which states that “influences of non-epistemic 
values on scientific inferences are epistemically bad if and only if they impede or obstruct 
the attainment of truths.” (2010, 15) In other words, influences of non-epistemic values are 
epistemically harmless if they don’t impede or obstruct the truth. In fact, if they are not 
only harmless, but also beneficial in guiding us towards truth, as I claim they can be, we 
can call them extrinsically epistemic. Let us take a closer look. 
13 
 
Steel analyses two cases in which influence of non-epistemic values is welcome, to show 
how this is possible. The first case is precisely about speed – how long to wait or how 
much data to collect before accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, and the other is about 
judging some mistakes worse than others. I will limit this analysis to the first type of cases. 
We have already seen that favoring speed, i.e. not waiting and not collecting additional, 
more detailed data, can be epistemically beneficial. I see no reason to regard this case as 
non-epistemic-but-legitimately-influencing, when it fits perfectly well under the scope of 
extrinsically epistemic values. If the default position of speed is for Steel extrinsically 
epistemic, as I contend it is, then what is non-epistemic, for example in the expedited 
assessment case, is the protection of human health as a value that motivates expedited risk 
assessments in the first place. If it doesn’t obstruct the attainment of truth, but often 
promotes it (we can’t help people by pursuing untruthful and time-insensitive practices), 
why wouldn’t we grant it an extrinsically epistemic status as well? There is no reason for 
separating the status of speed and the protection of human health in this particular case 
when the only criterion is their relation to the attainment of truth. After all, the 
circumstances matter. The protection of human health in these circumstances meets the 
condition of an extrinsically epistemic value. This becomes even clearer if we contrast it to 
fundability or diversity of viewpoints whose default position in Steel’s account is 
extrinsically epistemic. There seems to be no problem in calling fundability and diversity 
of viewpoints non-epistemic-but-legitimately-influencing in some cases. There is no 
grounded difference between that status and an extrinsically epistemic status.  
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Steel’s motivation is clear: he wants to save the argument from inductive risk which claims 
that non-epistemic values sometimes legitimately influence scientific research. And they 
do, but I claim that in those cases we can also call them extrinsically epistemic. They don’t 
impede or obstruct the attainment of truth and they often point in the direction of truth as, 
for example, time-sensitive practices, speed of getting at true results that they promote, and 
the protection of human health and economic benefits that motivate these time-sensitive 
practices. Introducing the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction didn’t save the distinction between 
epistemic and non-epistemic in the way Steel hoped it would. Now there is no proper scope 
for non-epistemic-but-legitimately-influencing, because extrinsically epistemic values have 
appropriated it, along with some of the values that used to be encountered on the lists of 
epistemic values, like simplicity and external consistency. Either there are only intrinsic 
epistemic values (namely, only empirical accuracy and internal consistency), and 
everything else is sometimes extrinsically epistemic (when it directs towards the truth in 
the given circumstances), otherwise it is non-epistemic because it doesn’t have anything to 
do with the truth-seeking endeavor; or there are robust and intrinsic epistemic values and 
everything else is non-epistemic, but sometimes legitimately influencing scientific 
research. In any case, one side of the dichotomy has to be broadly construed, be it the 
epistemic or the non-epistemic side.  
Steel endorsed a broad notion of epistemic which doesn’t fall in line with the usual 
epistemic side of the dichotomies (internal-external, fact-value, direct-indirect, 
constitutive-contextual etc.), but is constrained only by the relation to the attainment of 
truth. The alternative would be to be rigid on the epistemic side and count only intrinsic 
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epistemic values as epistemic, and then carefully assess particular cases to allow for a 
legitimate influence of non-epistemic values in particular instances of research assessed on 
a case to case basis. Non-epistemic values would then have to be broadly construed to 
involve both simplicity and external consistency. In fact, we are left with particularism 
about what is epistemic and what is non-epistemic in specific cases of scientific research. I 
don’t think that this is bad news, but it does show that Steel’s distinction doesn’t deliver on 
its promises.  
More importantly, the notion of values, especially as broadly construed as Steel’s, might be 
a misleading one in the first place. After all, not everything that we can talk about in this 
context is a value. As Justin Biddle puts it: “There are different factors that can fill the gap 
between ‘insight’   (i.e. logic, evidence, and epistemic values broadly construed) and 
decision making in science.” (Biddle 2013, 132) I believe that time-sensitivity is a good 
example of such a factor.  
 
5. Time-sensitivity  
The debate in which the notion of time-sensitivity is introduced provides us with 
understanding of both its non-epistemic setting and its epistemic directedness. Sometimes 
we have social and pragmatic reasons to have the results quickly. Sometimes a scientist 
may want to have the results soon in order to move forward with her career or research, 
even if she is honestly dedicated to truth. Scientific work is embedded in time-frames: of 
funding, career stages, a lifetime, a generation or of several generations. Whatever the 
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reasons may be, we will want to assign a desired time-frame for achieving certain ends in 
sight, even when it comes to “building block” science. We do want to see some results at 
some time. The assigned value of the desired time-frame is the level of time-sensitivity, 
and it can and does affect how different values pertaining to research practices are 
balanced against each other, most obviously speed and accuracy of methods. The aim of 
attaining the truth doesn’t only inform our methodological choices, it happens in time. It 
most certainly reflects an epistemic end, but is also motivated by all kinds of values and 
reasons. It would be misleading to call it a value, because it enters the picture as a 
judgment that has a say on how different values “hang” together. Even if the level of time-
sensitivity is very low, it still is present. 
For example, in basic science like gravitational wave physics, it takes a lot of time, 
computational power and extremely sensitive instruments to handle all the uncertainties 
related to the end-in-sight. Not long ago, the end-in-sight was the detection of gravitational 
waves. The time-sensitivity might have been estimated low at the beginning, especially 
since there are no immediate applications of the research; for now it has “only” yielded the 
benefit of better understanding of the universe and matter. In this case it was reasonable to 
expect decades of research without a robust result. However, with time passing by, the 
time-sensitivity of the detection attempts have grown nevertheless, because of huge 
cognitive and material investments which at some point require payoffs. Time-sensitivity 
motivates new procedures for error estimates, adding of computational power, and 
refinements of the instruments. Speeding up means coming up with new ways to get to the 
result, only in this context the tolerance for huge time-spans is higher. However, the 
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tolerance is also exhaustive if there is no measurable advancement. This will first be 
reflected in the shortage of funds and then in the shortage of researchers’ interest.  
This particular research succeeded: gravitational waves were first detected on September 
14, 2015, after more than 50 years of research. However, there are no guaranties that every 
research will be as successful as that, and it especially won’t be the case that 50 years will 
be an acceptable time-span for every research practice. In comparison, recent efforts 
around translation in biomedical sciences are in part a reaction to the fact that the average 
time-span between discovery and implementation of therapeutic practices, which has been 
estimated 17 years (Contopoulos et al. 2008, Morris et al. 2011), is considered way too 
long. Unsurprisingly, since the deliverances and applications of biomedical sciences are 
expected with much greater urgency than that of gravitational science. This judgment is so 
strong that it initiated a new model of biomedical research, namely translational science, 
dedicated to speeding up of the so called “bench to bedside” process. Time-sensitivity does 
have a saying on what the next step is and which values to prioritize in different research 
contexts.  
The examples discussed in the beginning of the paper elucidate the fact that a certain 
degree of time-sensitivity is present in the context in which scientific research is done, in 
the uses it has, and problems it aims to address. The degree of time-sensitivity is implicitly 
or explicitly estimated and it has a bearing on the trade-offs between different values, such 
as speed and accuracy. As we have seen, simplicity and ease of use transitively address 
time-sensitivity by contributing to speed of methods and practices. A method can generate 
results faster in comparison to another, and those results can be more or less accurate, but 
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how much the setting of this activity is time-sensitive is a contextual and evaluative 
judgment that gives rise to concerns about efficiency and has a saying on how different 
methodological values are balanced against each other in particular instances of research. It 
doesn’t fall exclusively under either epistemic or non-epistemic side of the dichotomy, it is 
rather informed by both: the aim of attainment of truth and the peculiarities of here and 
now. Highly time-sensitive issues favor expedited methods, in other words: higher the 
time-sensitivity, more valuable the speed.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I proposed an account of time-sensitivity, a notion introduced in Daniel 
Steel’s comment (2016) on Elliott and McKaughan (2014). Time-sensitivity is a feature of 
problems to be solved in their particular contexts, a feature recognized by an implicit or 
explicit evaluative judgment about a desired or expected time-frame of having a result 
which gives rise to concerns about efficiency and influences methodological choices. I 
firstly pointed to speed as a value of research methods and practices that most specifically 
addresses time-sensitivity. Then I argued along the lines of Steel (2010, 2016) why speed 
ought to be considered an epistemic value, contrary to Elliott and McKaughan (2014). 
After that I tried to account for time-sensitivity by using Steel’s distinction between 
extrinsically and intrinsically epistemic values (2010). I showed that his distinction fails to 
distinguish between extrinsically epistemic values and non-epistemic values, especially 
when their influence on research is legitimate.  
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